Legea minelor a cazut, dar nimeni nu stie ce pierde RomaniaThe Mining Law Has Been Rejected, Romania’s Loss Is Still Unknown

Din ciclul „saraca tara bogata”, am prezentat in articolul nostru precedent situatia resurselor solului si subsolului din Romania, aratand ca potentialul real al acestei ramuri economice poate asigura circa 15% din necesarul anual de minereuri al Uniunii Europene. Exista insa o conditie, de care nici un guvern postdecembrist nu s-a tinut pana la capat: reforma. Daca exploatarile miniere ar fi retehnologizate si legea ar permite accesul nediscriminatoriu al investitorilor altfel ar fi situatia la nivel macroeconomic, nu numai prin prisma zecilor de mii de locuri de munca, cat mai ales prin contributia acestei ramuri la PIB-ul Romaniei.

Se vorbeste cu insistenta in ultima perioada de cresterea redeventelor cu de doua sau trei ori mai mult decat sunt in prezent. La fel ca in cazul confuziei intretinute cu mare dibacie, conform careia noua lege a minelor este adresata exclusiv companiei Rosia Montana Gold Corporation si in cazul redeventelor, tinta principala este OMV Petrom. Nimeni nu ia in seama insa faptul ca stabilirea unor noi redevente, in contradictie cu realitatile economice, sau altfel spus „dupa ureche” are un impact total asupra intregului sector minier si implicit asupra companiilor romanesti care supravietuiesc de la o zi la alta. Pana la redevente sa ne oprim insa asupra reformei din sectorul minier, demarata in forta inca din anul 1997.

Restructurarea industriei miniere a inceput asadar in timpul guvernului Ciorbea, si ar fi trebuit incheiata prin 2010, cand o serie de subventii acordate de stat au disparut (la presiunea Uniunii Europene), indeosebi pentru sectorul nemetalifer. Obiectivul propus era ca in Romania sa functioneze numai minele viabile din punct de vedere economic, restul exploatarilor sa fie inchise, iar numarul angajatilor din sector sa se stabileasca undeva in jurul a 38.000. Evident, obiectivul nu a fost atins.

Cu exceptia concedierilor, unde suntem fruntasi tocmai pentru ca viabilitatea economica a unor exploatari nu a putut fi demonstrata. Asta nu inseamna ca nu se putea. Cresterea necesarului de minereuri la nivelul Uniunii Europene ar putea fi o solutie pentru redeschiderea unor exploatari. Statul a scos deja la vanzare principalele societati din domeniu (Cupru Min Abrud, Moldomin Moldova Noua, Baita Stei, Minbucovina Vatra Dornei, Societatea Nationala a Sarii Bucuresti, Compania Nationala a Cuprului, Aurului si Fierului CNCAF « Minvest » Deva, Compania Nationala a Metalelor Pretioase si Neferoase CNMPM « Remin » Baia Mare).

La cat de bine s-a priceput sa gestioneze procesul de privatizare, statul si noi implicit ne-am ales cu praful de pe toba. Ultima mare ratare a fost data de retragerea celor doi investitori din cursa de privatizare a CupruMin. Interesant este ca, daca in prima etapa nici un investitor nu era interesat de aceste exploatari, intre timp situatia s-a schimbat radical. Si, recent s-a mai schimbat odata, sau a revenit la faza de inceput. Potrivit Agentiei Nationale pentru Resurse Minerale (ANRM), in momentul de fata ar exista 1.900 zacaminte cu substante utile neenergetice. Mineralele neenergetice se clasifica in: minerale metalice (cupru, fier, argint etc), minerale industriale (sare, feldspat, caolin etc) si minerale de constructii. Cum se face ca piata le cere, dar investitorii se lasa asteptati? Raspunsul e simplu, statul nu stie sa vanda.

Dupa trecerea Societatii Nationale a Lignitului (SNLO) in componenta Complexului Energetic Oltenia si a Companiei Nationale a Huilei in componenta Complexului Energetic Hunedoara, structura mineritului in Romania se prezinta cam asa: pe sectorul minereuri metalifere sunt doua companii nationale (Minvest Deva si Remin Baia Mare) si patru societati comerciale, la acestea adaugandu-se Compania Nationala a Uraniului si Societatea Nationala a Sarii. In perioada 1990-2002, pana sa fie pusa in aplicare noua strategie, statul a cheltuit pentru sustinerea sectorului minier peste 6,5 miliarde dolari, din care numai pierderile din exploatare au fost de aproape 1,3 miliarde dolari. Productia a scazut si ea odata cu restructurarea, CNH Petrosani producand in jur de 3 milioane tone carbune pe an, iar CNL Oltenia in jur de 17-20 milioane tone anual.

Companiile si societatile miniere au inregistrat constant pierderi, uneori acestea depasind de doua ori nivelul subventiilor. La sfarsitul anului 2002, companiile miniere inregistrau obligatii neonorate in valoare de 41.505.986 milioane lei vechi, din care 18.294.373 milioane lei vechi erau datorii efective iar restul o reprezentau datoriile si penalitatile.

In context ar fi de discutat acuma despre sectorul de prelucrare, care s-a bucurat o perioada buna de cresterea preturilor pe pietele internationale, motiv pentru care a si supravietuit. Nici aici lucrurile nu stau pe roze in momentul de fata.

Metalurgia neferoasa din Romania poate produce de la aluminiu primar pana la cupru, zinc, plumb si produse prelucrate, asigurand circa 90% din necesarul de metale si aliaje neferoase. Dar, despre sectorul de prelucrare va trebui sa vorbim intr-un al material.

Under the heading ‘Poor Ol’ Rich Country’, our previous article made a roundup of Romania’s ground and underground resources and showed that the actual potential of this industry can cover approximately 15% of the EU’s yearly demand of ore. But there’s one condition, and no government after 1989 observed it to its final consequences: reform. If the mines would be overhauled, and should the law allow equal access for the investors, the macroeconomic context would be completely different, not just from the perspective of tens of thousands of workplaces, but also – and even more so – from the point of view of the contribution of this industry to Romania’s GDP.

There has been much talk lately about increasing the royalties, two-fold or three-fold the current levels. Just like the cunningly preserved misconception that the new Mining Law is dedicated to Rosia Montana Gold Corporation, the royalties issue is diverted to one target, namely OMV Petrom. No one takes into account, though, that setting new royalties against economic reality, or amateurishly, would have a sweeping impact on the whole mining industry, including the Romanian company surviving day by day. But before the royalties, let us look at reforms in the mining sector, boldly started as early as 1997.

The restructuring of the mining industry has actually begun under Mr. Victor Ciorbea’s cabinet and should have been completed by 2010, when a series of state subsidies has been terminated (yielding to EU’s pressure), especially for the non-metal sector. The aim was to keep only the economically viable mines in operation in Romania, while closing the other ones, and stabilizing the number of employees in this industry around 38.000. This target was obviously missed.

Except the redundancies, where Romania is a leader exactly because it couldn’t demonstrate the economic viability of some mines. It does not mean that proof was impossible to find. The increasing demand of ore within the European Union could be a justification for reopening some mines. The Romanian state already announced the sale of the main companies in this field (Cupru Min Abrud, Moldomin Moldova Noua, Baita Stei, Minbucovina Vatra Dornei, the National Company of Salt Bucharest, the National Company of Copper, Gold and Iron CNCAF Minvest Deva, the National Company of Precious and Non-ferrous Metals CNMPM Remin Baia Mare).

Given the state’s skills in privatization, the result was chicken feed. The latest failure was the withdrawal of the two investors competing for the privatization of CupruMin. Interestingly, while no investor was interested by it in the beginning, meanwhile the things have completely changed. And they changed again lately – by turning back to the starting point. According to Romania’s National Agency for Mineral Resources (ANRM), there are currently 1900 fields of non-fuel useful resources. Non-fuel minerals are classified as follows: metal ores (copper, iron, silver, etc.), industrial minerals (salt, feldspar, kaolin, etc.), and minerals for building materials. How comes there’s a demand on the market, but no investors rush? The answer is simple: the state is a bad seller.

After including the National Company of Lignite (SNLO) into the Oltenia Energy Complex, and the National Company of Hard Coal into the Hunedoara Energy Complex, the structure of the Romanian mining industry is roughly as follows: there are two national companies (Minvest Deva and Remin Baia Mare) and four enterprises for the metal ore, plus the Uranium National Company and the National Company of Salt. Between 1990 and 2002, before applying the new strategy, the state spent more than $6.5bn for mining subsidies, including operational losses of nearly $1.3bn. The production has dropped as restructuring went on, the National Company of Hard Coal in Petrosani currently yielding 3mn tons of coal per year, and the National Company of Lignite Oltenia around 17-20mn tons per year.

The mining companies and enterprises worked constantly in the red, sometimes by as much as twice the amount of the subsidies. At the end of 2002, the mining companies had outstanding debts of 41,505,986 million LEI (old currency), out of which 18,294,373 million LEI proper debts, and the remaining sum as penalties.

Within this context, it would be natural to continue by looking at the processing industry, who benefitted for many years from price raises on the international markets, which helped it survive. But it’s not all roses there either, lately.

Non-ferrous metallurgy in Romania cam produce anything from primary aluminum to copper, zing, lead, and fabricated products, covering around 90% of the demand of non-ferrous metals and alloys. We will address the processing sector in a future article.