Scandalul Lukoil a tras cortina: ce s-a ales din capacitatea de rafinare a Romaniei?Lukoil Scandal Draws the Curtain: What Became of Romania’s Refining Capacity?

Pe fondul relatiilor economice tot mai proaste dintre Romania si Rusia, inchiderea rafinariei Petrotel pica cum nu se poate mai prost. Noi pierdem niste locuri de munca, eventual niste taxe la stat, rusii pierd (sau nu) o pozitie de mijloc pe piata romaneasca a producatorilor si distribuitorilor de carburanti, care, spun ei, nu le-a prea adus profit. S-a ratoit la Lukoil presedintele Basescu, cum numai G. Dej o facea la adresa capitalistilor romani si straini inaintea vastei actiuni de nationalizare. Cam asa suna si avertismentul presedintelui Romaniei la adresa Lukoil. Nu asta ne intereseaza insa pe noi. Pana sa se ajunga aici va propunem o analiza a industriei de rafinare din Romania, una dintre cele mai performante din lume inainte de 1990, si ce s-a ales de ea in ultimii 25 de ani.

Ca o paranteza, merita a fi amintit ca atunci cand OMV Petrom a inchis rafinaria Arpechim nici un oficial roman nu a iesit la rampa ca sa dea peste nas grupului austriac, desi, in context, prima mare companie romaneasca afectata de aceasta masura a fost Oltchim, exact ca in cazul inchiderii rafinariei Petrotel. Dar, se pare ca noi avem o problema cu rusii. Dupa dezastrul combinatelor metalurgice Mechtel din Romania, jocul in forta a celor de la Lukoil a trezit la Palatul Cotroceni mandria nationala si la Palatul Victoria grija sociala. Dupa cum bine ne putem da seama, nici una nici alta nu au legatura cu aspectul economic al problemei, sau ce cel penal.

Si sa mai spunem ceva, o alta mare rafinarie din Romania (RAFO Onesti) a disparut din peisaj tot pe mana rusilor. Nici atunci nu s-a deranjat nimeni din randul clasei politice din Romania, cum se deranjeaza acum in cazul Petrotel Ploiesti. De, alte interese, alte scopuri.

Inainte de a vedea cum va evolua scandalul de la Lukoil (astazi se va lua probabil o decizie privind viitorul rafinariei) va propunem in exclusivitate o radiografie a industriei romanesti de rafinare, de la cum se prezenta ea in 1990, inainte de marea cacealma a privatizarii. Vom prezenta aceasta analiza in doua parti, pentru simplul motiv ca nici un segment de varf al industriei romanesti nu a suferit un dezastru precum cel al industriei petrochimice. Accentuam pe expresia „industrie de varf” cu argumente.

Dupa anul 1990, prin pierderea contractelor de barter cu Iranul, industria de prelucrare a titeiului din Romania a intrat intr-o profunda perioada de criza. Capacitatea de rafinare s-a redus de la aproape 30 de milioane tone titei/an, la 10-11 milioane tone si chiar mai putin, motiv pentru care ideea inchiderii unor rafinarii a devenit politica de stat. Mai mult, intr-un studiu comandat de statul roman unor companii americane se preciza clar ca Romania are o capacitate de rafinare excedentara si, in concluzie, se impunea inchiderea unor capacitatI de productie.

Guvernul Ciorbea a luat de bun studiul respectiv, renuntand la privatizarea unor rafinarii si propunand intrarea lor direct in lichidare. Din fericire, sau nefericire, conjunctura internationala de pe piata produselor petroliere a stopat procesul de lichidare si a adus in prim plan privatizarea. Facuta lent si neprofesionsit, privatizarea a creat si ea o serie de probleme, de abia dupa anul 2000 rafinariile din Romania intrand in proprietate privata, cu costuri imense insa pentru statul roman. Autorii studiului au recomandat inchiderea unor rafinarii romanesti mai mult din razbunare decat din motive de natura economica.In vremea regimului comunist, Romania exporta in jur de 3,5 milioane tone benzina si in jur de 4 milioane tone motorina, facand un adevarat dumping pe piata europeana.

Tractoare contra titei

Pe marginea contractului semnat cu Iranul pe vremea regimului comunist, Romania primea mari cantitati de titei din aceasta tara, pe care il prelucra in rafinariile romanesti, pentru ca mai apoi o mare parte din produsele finite sa fie vandute, in Mediterana, la pret de dumping catre tarile occidentale. In schimbul titeiului iranian, Romania livra acestei tari tractoare, ciment si alte produse ale industriei prelucratoare, schimburi care justificau la vremea respectiva si dezvoltarea capacitatilor de rafinare de la noi. Aceste capacitati de prelucrare au ajuns la nivelul de 34 milioane tone titei/an, intreg sistemul de prelucrare al titeiului fiind conceput ca un sistem integrat de rafinare cu instalatii de prelucrare secundara a produselor petroliere (instalatii de reformare catalitica, cracare catalitica si tratare cu hidrogen a distilatelor medii), in rafinariile mari.

Respectivele rafinarii au fost concepute sa prelucreze in special titeiuri din import sulfuroase, in timp ce rafinariile mici urmau sa prelucreze in exclusivitate titeiuri indigene, nesulfuroase. Toate rafinariile mari aveau in structura lor instalatii de tratare catalitica cu hidrogen, reformare catalitica si cracare catalitica, lucru ce permitea obtinerea unor productii mari mai mari de benzine octanice. Din punct de vedere tehnologic, toate rafinariile mari din Romania puteau concura cu rafinariile din tarile dezvoltate, lucru care nu a stiut sa fie insa exploatat de catre guvernele postdecembriste. A urmat privatizarea, dupa modelul pustieste si apoi vinde.

(va urma)As the economic relations between Romania and Russia deteriorate, the shutdown of the Petrotel refinery couldn’t occur in a worse moment. We lose some jobs; Russia might or might not lose a middle position on the Romanian market of fuel production and distribution, which they say did not bring much profit. President Basescu jumped all over them, as only communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej used to do with Romanian and foreign capitalists before the wide-scale nationalization. That’s how the President’s warning to Lukoil sounded; but it’s not a matter of interest for us. Before getting to this point, we propose an analysis of Romania’s refining industry, one of the world’s most performing before 1990, and of its fate over the past 25 years.

As a parenthesis, it’s worth mentioning that, when OMV Petrom shut down the Arpechim refinery, no Romanian official stepped up to berate the Austrian group, although Oltchim was the most affected by this decision, just as in Petrotel’s case. But we seem to have a problem with Russians. After the disaster of Mechtel’s metallurgical factories in Romania, Lukoil’s power game aroused the national pride at the Cotroceni Palace, and social concerns at Victoria Palace. As we can clearly see, none of these feelings are related to the economic side of the issue – or with the criminal one, for that matter.

Let us add that another big refinery in Romania, RAFO Onesti, has completely vanished also with Russian involvement. No Romanian politician was disturbed back then, either, just as they don’t now with Petrotel Ploiesti. Well, different interests, different goals.

Before witnessing the evolution of the Lukoil scandal (a decision on the refinery’s future is expected today), we propose an exclusive radiography of Romania’s refining industry, starting with its state in 1990, before the big privatization hoax. We will divide this analysis in two parts, as petrochemistry’s disaster is unparalleled with any other top sector of Romanian industry. We have arguments to stress “top sector.”
After 1990, the loss of barter contracts with Iran opened a deep crisis in Romania’s oil processing industry. The refining capacity dropped from almost 30 million metric tons of crude oil per year to 10-11 million metric tons or less, and thus the idea of shutting down some refineries became a state policy. Moreover, a state-commissioned study carried out by American companies clearly showed that Romania has an surplus of refining capacity, and concluded that closing some production capacities is mandatory.

PM Ciorbea’s government took that as a gospel truth and gave up the privatization of some refineries, proposing their direct liquidation instead. Fortunately or not, the international oil market context stopped this process and brought forward the privatization. Carried out in a slow, unprofessional way, it nevertheless resulted in trouble. It wasn’t until 2000 that Romania’s refineries passed to private owners’ hands, with huge costs for the state. The study’s authors recommended the shutdown more as revenge than based on economic reasons. Under the communist regime, Romania used to export roughly 3.5 million tons of gasoline and 4 million tons of diesel fuel per year, practically dumping the European market.

Tractors for crude oil
On the margin of the contract signed with Iran under the communist regime, Romania received large amounts of oil, processed it in the refineries, and sold a big part of the refined products to European countries in the Mediterranean basin, at dumping prices. Iran was paid back with tractors, cement and other processed products. At that time, this trade also justified the development of Romania’s refining capacities, which eventually reached 35 million tons per year. The whole crude processing system was designed as an integrated one, with refining followed by secondary processing of oil derivatives (catalytic reforming, catalytic cracking and hydrogenation of the medium fraction distillate) in large-scale refineries.

These were designed to process especially sour crude oil, while smaller refineries were to use domestic sweet crude. All the big refineries had catalytic hydrogenation, reforming and cracking and facilities allowing obtaining higher proportions of high-octane gasoline. Technologically, they were competing with developed countries’ refineries, but the post-1989 governments were incapable of taking advantage of that. Privatization ensued, based on the plunder-and-sell model.

(to be continued)